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2Abstract
We develop a model of endogenous network formation in order to examine the incen-
tives for R&D collaboration in a mixed oligopoly. Our analysis reveals that the complete
network, where each rm collaborates with all others, is uniquely stable. When R&D sub-
sidies are not available, in addition to the complete network, the private partial and the
private-hub star networks are Pareto e¢ cient. However, the complete network becomes
the unique Pareto e¢ cient network when R&D is subsidised. This result is in contrast
with earlier contributions in private oligopoly where under strong market rivalry a con-
ict between stable and e¢ cient networks is likely to occur. It also highlights the role of
a public rm as policy instrument in aligning individual incentives for collaboration with
the objective of e¢ ciency, independently of whether R&D subsidies are provided by the
regulator.
1 Introduction
In advanced industrial economies, R&D collaboration plays a crucial role for the creation,
exploitation and di¤usion of knowledge. Firms participating in collaboration agreements
innovate more frequently than others and discover more original innovations (Beise and
Stahl 1999). In doing so collaborating rms are able to increase their protability and
achieve superior economic performance than their non-collaborating counterparts.
An important feature of collaboration agreements is that they often engage both
private and public rms. Mixed oligopoly is a very common form of market in Europe
and in Japan following the introduction of competition into traditional state monopolies.
An example of R&D collaboration in mixed oligopoly is the Norwegian industry for fuel
cells and hydrogen technologies. In particular, Norways portfolio includes a variety of
R&D projects aimed at the development of environmentally clean and e¢ cient energy
3technologies (see Godø et al. 2003). These projects are organised as research consortia
between R&D intensive rms including state-owned companies such as Statoil.
The objective of this paper is to explore the role of a public rm in inuencing the
structure of the network, and the potential implications of a public rms presence for
the relationship between equilibrium industry structure and performance, two key issue
of the literature on R&D networks. The most natural way of studying which network
architectures will materialise is to adopt Jackson and Wolinskys (1996) concept of pair-
wise stability. It requires that a network is pairwise stable if no rm has an incentive to
delete one of its existing links and no pair of rms want to establish a new link. Note
that this condition is quite weak and thus should be seen only as a necessary condition
for stability. Pairwise stability allows for deviations by a pair of rms. However, it could
be the case that a group of rms can improve their competitive position by deleting or
adding several links, which is not a possible deviation in the context of pairwise stable
networks. To this end, Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005) introduced the concept
of strong stability: we say that a network is strongly stable if it survives all possible
deviations by a coalition of rms.1
In particular, we are primarily interested in the following questions:
(i) What are the incentives of competing rms that pursue e¢ ciency-enhancing in-
novations to create networks for the purpose of sharing new knowledge? What is the
architecture of the networks that will endogenously emerge?
(ii) How does the presence of a state-owned company a¤ect the network structure;
and, are individual incentives to form networks adequate from an e¢ ciency point of view?
To answer these questions, we consider an environment with a public rm and two
private rms. The timing of moves is as follows. In stage one, prior to competing in the
product market, rms create collaboration ties. The purpose of collaboration agreements
4is the sharing of know-how about a cost-reducing technology. Six conceivable network
structures arise from this stage. Under the complete network all rms are connected,
whereas under the empty network there are no collaborative ties. A star network entails
that there is a hubrm, either public or private, that maintains a direct link with two
spokerms, whereas the latter are indirectly connected via the hub. Finally, under
a partial network there is only a pair of rms with a collaborative link. In stage two,
rms choose a non-cooperative level of R&D e¤ort. A rms own R&D e¤ort together
with the e¤ort of its partners and the structure of the network determine its operating
costs. In the last stage, rms compete in the market of a homogeneous good by choosing
their quantities.
Our rst result concerns the relationship between the level of collaborative activity
and individual R&D e¤ort. We nd that even though R&D e¤ort decreases with the
number of alliances of a private rm, it increases with the number of alliances of the
public rm.2 To see intuitively why this happens, notice that the formation of a link
implies two e¤ects. On the one hand, as a rm establishes a link, it drives down its
own production costs and expands its output. On the other hand, the costs of partner
rms become lower too, which makes them tougher competitors. It turns out that this
negative e¤ect cannot be outweighed by the positive e¤ect of collaboration on a rms
own quantity, thereby leading a private rm to exert a lower R&D e¤ort. By contrast,
both e¤ects pull in the same direction when the public rm engages in collaborations and
thus lead to a greater R&D e¤ort. While this is so in the absence of R&D subsidies, it
turns out that the provision of an R&D subsidy encourages not only the public rm but
also the private rms to put in a higher e¤ort when they engage in collaborations.
Our second result explores the stability properties of R&D networks. In particular,
we show that the complete network is the unique pairwise stable and strongly stable
network. This nding is mainly driven by the fact that the public rm is an aggressive
5competitor as it produces more output than a private rm. A higher output induces
the private rms to form links in order to limit the competitive strength of the public
rm. Thus our result can be interpreted in the following natural way: the stability of the
complete network is not due to any enhancing e¤ect of public ownership on the private
rms incentives to collaborate. Rather, it is due to the maximising behaviour of the
public rm, which encourages collaboration by leaving a small residual demand to the
private rms.
Our next result looks at the e¢ ciency properties of R&D networks. In particular,
we establish that the complete network is Pareto e¢ cient, independently of the extent
of technological spillovers. The private partial network and the private-hub star network
are also Pareto e¢ cient but within a smaller range of spillover values. More interestingly,
when R&D subsidies are provided by the regulator, the complete network becomes the
unique Pareto e¢ cient network. Taken together, these results carry an important mes-
sage: they suggest that a public rm can reconcile individual incentives for collaboration
with the objective of e¢ ciency, independently of whether R&D is subsidised.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Our paper contributes to the growing literature on R&D networks. This literature
focuses mainly on the analysis of the network architectures that will endogenously emerge
and on the e¢ ciency properties of the resulting networks. Goyal and Moraga-González
(2001) do so in a setting with an arbitrary number of horizontally related rms and
symmetric networks. They also analyse the three-rm case, which focuses on strategic
incentives for collaboration by allowing rms to gain competitive advantages. Since this
study it has been widely accepted that stable and e¢ cient networks can di¤er. Goyal
and Moraga-González (2001) nd that such a conict arises when spillovers are not too
6small. Mauleon, Sempere-Monerris, and Vannetelbosch (2008) provide a corresponding
nding in a setting where each rm sets its own wage.
Song and Vannetelbosch (2007) investigate the possibility of resolving the potential
conict between stable and e¢ cient networks by means of an R&D subsidisation policy.
In particular, using a setting with three rms located in di¤erent countries and selling
a (homogeneous) good within an internationally integrated product market, they show
that the likelihood of a conict is reduced but it is still present in the cases of very small
or quite large spillovers.3 In light of this, our result yields an insight into the role of a
public rm as a policy instrument in regulating innovative activity. It suggests that a
public rm can align individual incentives for collaboration with the objective of e¢ ciency,
independently of whether R&D subsidies are provided by the regulator. Other authors
have reported similar conclusions though in a di¤erent context. In particular, Mauleon et
al. (2008) nd that the complete network emerges as the unique stable architecture when
the labour market is unionised and wages are set at the rm-level. Also, the complete
network maximises industry prots and so is the unique (strongly) e¢ cient network.
Our paper also contributes to the R&D literature in mixed oligopolies. Delbono
and Denicolò (1993) examine the role of a public rm in regulating innovative activity
in a mixed duopoly with perfectly protected innovations. They show that a welfare-
maximizing rm can alleviate the overinvestment problem in the private duopoly. Poyago-
Theotoky (1998) investigates the case of easy imitation in R&D, showing that most of the
results of Delbono and Denicolò (1993) can actually be reversed.4 Our approach is richer
in the sense that the strategic e¤ects of the R&D are mediated through a network of
R&D collaboration within which the place rms occupy and the structure of the network
play an important role. This in turn may give us a more comprehensive view of how
research incentives are shaped in the present context.5
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
7The next section contains our results on the stability and e¢ ciency properties of R&D
networks. In section 4, we consider extensions of our model and, in section 5, we conclude.
The equilibrium of the di¤erent network structures is characterised in the Appendix 1,
and the proofs that are not included in the main text are relegated to the Appendix 2.
2 The model
We consider a model of endogenous network formation. Firms create collaboration links
to transfer knowledge on a new technology which enhances their productive e¢ ciency and
hence, lowers costs. We study the incentives for R&D collaboration, paying particular
attention to the form that strategic alliances can take, and then compare stable with
e¢ cient networks. We proceed rst to develop the necessary terminology and denitions.
Networks of collaboration. Let N = f0; 1; 2g be the set of rms. The set comprises
a public rm (indexed by i = 0) and 2 identical private rms. The inverse demand
function of the homogeneous good produced by the rms is P (Q) = a Q, where Q  a
and Q =
P
i2N qi. We will say that any two members of N , i and j, are linked under the
network g if fi; jg 2 g. For simplicity, we write ij to represent the link fi; jg, so that
ij 2 g implies that rms i and j maintain a collaboration link under network g. Dene a
collaboration network as a collection of such pairwise links f(ij)i;j2Ng. In any network g,
nodes represent the rms and each link represents an R&D partnership. Firms can add
or sever links from a given network.6 We have that g+ ij is the network resulting from g
if rms i and j form a new link between them. Similarly, g   ij is the network resulting
from the deletion of the link between i and j. Let Ni(g) be the set of links of rm i in
network g and let G be the set of all possible networks.
Within an industry consisting of three rms, we have the following network architec-
tures: (i) the complete network, gc, in which the level of collaborative activity is maximal,
8i.e. all rms are connected to each other; (ii) the star network, in which one rm (hub)
is connected with two others (spokes), while the latter are indirectly connected via the
hub. Note that there are two cases to be distinguished here: either the public rm or
any of the private rms can be a hub. We call the former public-hub star network, gs0,
and the latter private-hub star network, gs. (iii) Next we have the partially connected
network, in which any two rms are connected while the third rm is isolated. Under the
partially connected network either two private rms can maintain a link or the public
rm can be linked with a private rm. We call the former private partial network, gp, and
the latter public partial network, gp0. (iv) Finally, we have the empty network (ge), in
which the level of collaborative activity is minimal, i.e. there are no collaboration links.
With two private rms and one public rm eight network architectures are possible;
however, only six of them yield qualitatively di¤erent results. These network architectures
are presented in Figure 1.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
R&D e¤orts and spillovers. Given a network g, each rm carries out R&D to reduce
its marginal cost. R&D e¤ort is costly with cost represented by the quadratic function
 (ei) = e
2
i ,  > 0; this reects diminishing returns to the level of R&D e¤ort ei. For
simplicity, we set  = 1 which ensures non-negativity of all variables.
Firms can attain a further reduction in their marginal costs by forming collaboration
links. Given a network g and a collection of R&D e¤orts fei(g)gi2N , rm is total e¤ective
R&D is given by
Ei(fei(g)gi2N) = ei + ( ej
t(ij)
+
ek
t(ik)
), i 6= j 6= k: (1)
The e¤ective level of R&D is the total reduction in a rms marginal cost and has two
9components: the own research e¤ort ei and the e¤ort prole of rm is research partners
fej; ekg; i 6= j 6= k: We assume that the extent of information leakage or degree of
spillovers benet collaborating rms at an exogenously given rate ,  2 (0; 1]. The rate of
knowledge transmission, the spillover rate, depends on the distance among collaborating
rms. The distance between two rms i and j in a network g is dened as the number
of links in the shortest path between them. We denote by t(ij) the number of links in
the shortest path between i and j, and we set t(ij) =1 to denote the absence of a path
between them. Therefore, spillovers that result from direct collaborations are always
larger than those obtained from indirect ones, since t(ij) = 1 in the case of a direct
relationship.
The process of knowledge transmission is central to our analysis and so we further
discuss the ideas underlying it. It follows Mauleon et al. (2008) and suggests that every
collaborative agreement benets from partial spillovers while there is no spillover outow
to non-collaborators. Goyal and Moraga-González (2001) focus instead on spillovers
outside a given network. In particular, their formulation di¤ers from ours in the following
key respects.7
First, spillovers from direct collaborations are not fully absorbed. The assumption
of partial spillovers reects that knowledge comprises know-how that is rm-specic and
thus cannot be easily absorbed and/or utilised by the research partners. This is also
motivated by the growing complexity of new technologies and the implementation of
distinctive processes within each rm. For example, if Sony and Philips decide to establish
an agreement to reduce their costs for a DVD technology, they rst need to set up common
standards. This means that rms have to forgo short-term prot objectives anticipating
to enhance their product-market positioning in the long-run.8 However, in most cases,
collaboration agreements are driven by both objectives at the same time, which justies
our focus on partial within-the-network spillovers (see Narula and Hagedoorn 1999). A
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related observation behind our assumption reects the idea that rms need to build their
absorptive capacity in order to benet from technological spillovers (Cohen and Levinthal
1989). Because building absorptive capacity is costly, rms are able to incorporate only
part of their partnersknowledge into their innovation process. In contrast, Goyal and
Moraga-González assume that collaborating rms can fully benet from each others
R&D e¤orts (i.e. there are perfect spillovers).
Second, empirical evidence suggests that the extent of knowledge transmission de-
pends on the distance between collaborating rms.9 As a way of capturing this empirical
observation, we postulate that spillovers depend on the distance between collaborating
rms and, in particular, they diminish with increasing distance between a pair research
partners. Close in spirit to our approach, Piga and Poyago-Theotoky (2005) develop a
Hotelling-type model to investigate rms location decisions when R&D investment is
directed towards enhancing product quality. In this paper, location decisions and thus,
the distance in a literal sense between rms, have a bearing on the degree of knowl-
edge dissemination. Finally, contrary to Goyal and Moraga-González, the present paper
makes a clear distinction between directly and indirectly connected rms, although these
authors treat both types of rms alike, assuming the same incoming spillover.
Payo¤s. A network of collaboration is a collection of pairwise links in which the level of
R&D e¤ort and the extent of knowledge transmission depends on the place where rms
locate in a given network. The cost of rm i in network g when rm i produces output
qi, and rm is e¤ective R&D output is Ei, is given by10
Ci(qi; Ei; g) = (c  Ei(g))qi(g) + q2i (g); i 2 N , a > c > 0. (2)
Our specication of the cost function reects the fact that all rms are ex ante equally
e¢ cient. If the public rm was more e¢ cient it would serve the entire market; and if it
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was too ine¢ cient this would leave room for potential privatisation.11 We have further
introduced a quadratic term in the rms cost function to avoid situations where the
private rms are driven out of the market altogether. Because our primary purpose is to
study strategic interactions between a public and two private rms, this assumption is
a natural way to do so by allowing for cost di¤erences between the rms in equilibrium.
This means that the public rm will incur a higher marginal cost, given that it seeks to
maximise total surplus.12
As concerns private rms, they are assumed to maximise own prot
i(g) = [a  qi(g)  qj(g)  qk(g)]qi(g)  Ci(g)  e2i (g), (3)
whereas the public rm maximises welfare dened as the sum of consumer surplus and
producer prots
W (g) =
Q2(g)
2
+
2X
i=0
i(g). (4)
The form of the public rms objective function, placing equal weight on consumer and
producer surplus, accords with utilitarianism or doctrines aimed at promoting fairness
among consumers and producers. This is consistent with the purpose of this work which
is to compare stable with e¢ cient networks. In other words, we intend to examine the
circumstances under which the presence of a public rm reconciles private incentives
for collaboration with the objective of e¢ ciency, which is a normative question. We
thus restrict attention to an equally-weighted form of welfare function. Furthermore, we
note that the assumption of welfare maximisation neglects any agency problems between
the government and the public rm. However, this is an initial attempt to study R&D
networks with a public rm, and in order to focus on strategic aspects of the interaction
between the rms in this setting, maintaining this assumption provides a building block
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for the analysis of more general cases. We note that the literature on mixed oligopoly
has extensively used similar assumptions (see e.g. Anderson et al. 1997; De Fraja and
Delbono 1989; Pal and White 1998; White 2002; Fjell and Heywood 2004).
The timing of moves. We construct a three-stage game: in stage one, rms choose
simultaneously and independently their collaborative links. In stage two, rms choose an
individual level of R&D e¤ort and, in the last stage, they compete in quantities.
The timing of moves reects that a long-run decision, such as the formation of links,
may have considerable e¤ects on shorter-run decisions, such as the specic level of R&D
and output. That is, when the rms decide which links to establish it is natural to antic-
ipate how this may inuence their R&D decisions and their product-market positioning.
This timing which is standard in the R&D network literature also allows us to capture
the commitment value of collaboration (see e.g. Narula and Hagedoorn 1999). To solve
this multi-stage game, we rst obtain the equilibrium of stages two to three by backward
induction. Finally, we solve stage one, the network formation stage, by applying the
notion of pairwise stability.
3 Network formation
R&D EFFORTS
We begin our analysis by addressing the following question: What is the impact of
forming links on the rmsR&D e¤ort? Would an increase in the number of strategic
alliances increase own R&D e¤ort or would it induce a reduction in the e¤ort due to
free-riding? Our notational convention is as follows. The superscript l refers to a linked
rm in a partially connected network and the superscript h denotes the hubin a star
network. The superscripts e, p0, p, s0, s, c stand for the empty, public partial, private
partial, public-hub star, private-hub star and complete networks. Proposition 1 reports
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how changes in the level of collaborative activity a¤ect the rmsR&D e¤ort.
Proposition 1 The public rms R&D e¤ort:
(i) Increases with the number of own links.
(ii) Increases with the degree of R&D spillovers unless a private partial network is
formed.
A private rms R&D e¤ort:
(iii) Decreases with the number of own links except in the move from the empty network
to the public partial network if R&D spillovers are su¢ ciently large.
(iv) Decreases with the degree of R&D spillovers except under a public partial network
and a public-hub star network where it is non-monotone and achieves a minimum when
 is approximately equal to 0.46 and 0.62, respectively.
Proof. (i) Follows directly from the comparison e0(ge) < el0(g
p0) < eh0(g
s0). (ii) Follows
by di¤erentiating the public rms R&D e¤ort in the various network architectures. (iii)
Follows from the comparisons e(ge) < el(gp0) < eh(gs) and e(ge) < el(gp) < eh(gs). From
Tables 7 and 9, we have e(ge)  el(gp0) if and only if   0:92 and e(ge) > el(gp0),
otherwise. (iv) Follows by di¤erentiating each private rms R&D e¤ort in the various
network architectures.
Result (i) states that when the public rm forms additional links, it nds particularly
appealing to increase its R&D e¤ort. This highlights the combined e¤ect underlying
direct and indirect spillovers. Specically, in the move from the empty to the public
partial network, the public rm can benet from direct spillovers. By moving then to the
public-hub star network, the public rm can appropriate technological know-how not only
through direct but also indirect links. Intuitively, the e¢ ciency e¤ect of adding a link is
to increase the public rms output by reducing own production costs. A higher output
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makes further increases in R&D e¤ort more worthwhile because the potential gains from
higher e¢ ciency will spread across more units of output.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
By result (ii) these e¤ects are more pronounced when the spillover rate within a
given network increases because of the greater potential for inter-rm communication
and learning. In contrast, the private rmsmove from the empty to the private partial
network reduces the public rms market share and thereby reduces its R&D e¤ort by
leading to a lower level of public rm output. The negative e¤ect of remaining isolated
becomes more pronounced as the spillover rate increases, which produces the lower e¤ort
of the public rm under a private partial network, as Proposition 1 reports.
Result (iii) states that a private rm exerts a lower e¤ort when it links with other rms.
An increase in the number of links reduces own production costs because a rm can benet
from the investments of its partners. The addition of links also lowers production costs
of partner rms and thereby increases the intensity of product market competition. The
resulting increase in the intensity of competition outweighs the corresponding increase
in own e¢ ciency. Consequently, R&D e¤ort is lower when a private rm forms research
partnerships (see Goyal and Moraga-González 2001). In contrast, in the move from the
empty network to the public partial network, a private rm increases its R&D e¤ort when
spillovers are su¢ ciently large, because it can reduce the market share and thereby limit
the competitive strength of the isolated rm.
Result (iv) refers to the role of spillovers for the level of the private rmsR&D e¤ort.
When the rate of spillover increases, partner rms become more aggressive competitors.
The resulting increase in the intensity of competition decreases R&D e¤ort because a
private rm will have an incentive to free ride on its partners research e¤orts. An
exception to this rule is again the public partial network. In this case, a higher e¤ort
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increases the output of the linked rms and thereby reduces the output of the isolated
rm. Therefore, a private rm will put in a higher e¤ort when spillovers increase beyond
as certain threshold, as part (iv) of Proposition 1 states. Furthermore, within a public-
hub star network a private rm realises that by increasing its own R&D e¤ort it can
enhance the public rms payo¤ because the public rm takes into account private prot.
The public rm benets from greater private e¤ort and thereby increases its own R&D
e¤ort, which benets the private rm. Consequently, a private rm will increase its e¤ort
under a public-hub star network when spillovers increase beyond a certain level.
STABILITY AND EFFICIENCY
PAIRWISE STABILITY
R&D alliances are conceptualised in terms of pairwise links which are embedded in a
more general context of bilateral relations a network. Therefore, to address the issue
of network formation, one can use the denition of pairwise stability to examine which
network architectures will endogenously emerge. The following denition is due to Jack-
son and Wolinsky (1996) and refers to the rms incentives to alter the structure of a
network by creating or severing bilateral links. This denition is quite weak and should
therefore be seen only as a necessary condition for stability (Jackson and Wolinsky 1996;
Goyal and Moraga-González 2001).
Denition 1 A network g is pairwise stable if the following conditions are satised:
(i) If rms i; j 2 N are private
(a) for all ij 2 g, i(g)  i(g   ij) and j(g)  j(g   ij), and
(b) for all ij =2 g, if i(g) < i(g + ij), then j(g) > j(g + ij).
(ii) If rm i is public and rm j is private
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(a) for all ij 2 g, W (g)  W (g   ij) and j(g)  j(g   ij), and
(b) for all ij =2 g, if W (g) < W (g + ij), then j(g) > j(g + ij) (and vice versa).
The denition of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) is adapted to allow for a public rm as
a member of a network. In the absence of a public rm, denition 1 reduces to conditions
i(a) and i(b) that have been used in related papers by Goyal and Moraga-González (2001),
Song and Vanettelbosch (2007), Mauleon et al. (2008), among others. Denition 1 says
that a network is pairwise stable if it survives all possible deviations at a bilateral level,
that is, if no rms have an incentive to delete one of their links, and no pair of rms want
to form a new link with one beneting strictly and the other at least weakly (see Jackson
and Wolinsky 1996; Mauleon et al. 2008). Thus, joint consent is required in order to
establish a bilateral relationship (i.e. a link cannot be enforced), and a link can be simply
deleted unilaterally. We apply this denition to study pairwise stable networks.
Proposition 2 In the presence of a public rm, the unique pairwise stable collaboration
network is the complete network.
It appears that in the empty, partial and star networks rms that are not connected
have an incentive to establish a collaboration. Interestingly, in the private partial network
gp, in which there is a collaborative agreement between the private rms whereas the
public rm is isolated, it turns out that each private rm has an incentive to set up
a new link with the public rm in order to become the hub in the ensuing private-
hub star network gs. Because the public rm is better o¤ by engaging in collaboration
with a private rm, the private partial network is destabilised, thus giving rising to the
private-hub star network, i.e. W (gs) > W (gp) and h(gs) > l(gp) see Figures 3 and 4.
This is in contrast with the outcome in a purely private market. In this case, the
partial network remains stable for small spillovers if R&D is not subsidised (Goyal and
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Moraga-González 2001). When R&D subsidies are available, though, the partially con-
nected network becomes stable for intermediate spillovers (Song and Vannetelbosch 2007).
The intuition behind these results stems from the large disparities between the linked rms
and the isolated one in a partially connected network, which make (in extreme cases) the
isolated rm to exit the market. By contrast, Proposition 2 indicates that when a public
rm is isolated, then each linked rm has an incentive to establish a connecting link
with it. The reason is that the public rm invests in R&D more than a private rm,
so that setting up a link with it enables a private rm to increase its payo¤ through
direct spillovers both from the public rm and from its current partner. This, in turn,
destabilises the private partial network gp, leading to the private-hub star network gs.
By analogous reasoning, in the private-hub star network, the private rm at one of the
spokes has an incentive to establish a new link with the public rm; this gives rise to the
complete network given that the public rm always benets from having an additional
collaboration, i.e. W (gc) > W (gs) and (gc) > (gs) again, see Figures 3 and 4.
Next, consider the public-hub star network gs0. In this case, the private rms have
an incentive to link to each other in order to limit the public rms competitive strength,
i.e. (gc) > (gs0). This in turn destabilises the public-hub star network, giving rise
to the complete network. Thus the presence of a public rm increases the degree of
partnering intensity, so that the complete network becomes the unique pairwise stable
architecture. It is noteworthy that the stability of the complete network is not the
outcome of any enhancing e¤ect of public ownership on the private rmsincentives to
collaborate. Rather, it is due to the maximising behaviour of public rm which reduces
the market share and so reduces the prots that accrue to the private rms. Therefore,
the private rms have an incentive to establish new collaborations in order to o¤set the
negative e¤ect on their prots resulting from the public rms behaviour. This result is
also consistent with the case in which all rms are private because the complete network
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is always pairwise stable then.
Our nal observation concerns the role of spillovers in the stability of the complete
network. Note that the relevant network architectures become more prominent when
spillovers are relatively large. By contrast, in the limiting case that spillovers tend to zero,
the network architectures become very similar. Consequently, when spillovers become
smaller, this leads to a decrease of the (potential) losses from deleting a link from the
complete network.
STRONG STABILITY
We proceed to perform an additional check for stability by resorting to the notion of
strong stability due to Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005). This notion of stability
refers to the incentives of a coalition of rms to redistribute their collaboration links, and
so it allows for situations which are not accounted for under pairwise stability. Indeed,
we will say that a network g is strongly stable when it survives all possible changes in the
number of its links by a coalition of agents. Because strong stability is a renement of
pairwise stability, the only candidate for strongly stable network is the complete network.
Possible deviations from the complete network are the following: (i) the coalition of the
two private rms deleting their links with the public rm to form the private partial
network, gp; (ii) the coalition of the public rm and one private rm severing their link
with the other private rm to form the public partial network, gp0; and the coalition
of all rms deleting their connecting links to establish the empty network, ge. It turns
out none of these deviations increases the payo¤ of the coalition of agents attempting to
alter the structure of the complete network. Consequently, the complete network emerges
endogenously as the unique strongly stable network.
This result sharply contrasts with the outcome in a purely private market. When
all rms are prot-maximisers and the government does not subsidise R&D, the par-
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tially connected network is the unique strongly stable network if spillovers are su¢ ciently
small (Song and Vannetelbsoch 2007). When R&D is subsidised, though, the partially
connected network remains stable against deviations by a coalition of rms if spillovers
obtain intermediate values (Song and Vannetelbsoch 2007). In contrast, our analysis
shows that the partially connected network is no longer pairwise stable in a mixed mar-
ket, and so it cannot be strongly stable too. Firms have instead incentives to connect to
each other in order to form the complete network.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
EFFICIENCY
In this section, we examine the e¢ ciency properties of the R&D networks. Such analysis
is important to understand the relationship between stable and e¢ cient networks, a key
issue of the network literature in oligopolistic industries.
Pareto e¢ ciency is a natural notion of e¢ ciency: we will say that a network g 2 G
is Pareto e¢ cient if it is not Pareto dominated by any other network. That is, if there
does not exist g0 2 G such that W (g0)  W (g) and i(g0)  i(g) for all i 2 f1; 2g,
and with strict inequality for some rm either public or private. Application of this
denition reveals that only three networks architectures are Pareto e¢ cient. Importantly,
the complete network is the unique Pareto e¢ cient network when spillovers are su¢ ciently
large. The following Proposition elaborates.
Proposition 3 The complete network gc is always Pareto e¢ cient, the private-hub star
network gs is Pareto e¢ cient if and only if spillovers are not too large ( < 0:82) and
the private partial network gp is Pareto e¢ cient if and only if spillovers are su¢ ciently
small ( < 0:13). The public-hub star network gs0, the public partial network gp0 and
the empty network ge are never Pareto e¢ cient.
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Taken together with our ndings on the stability properties of the di¤erent networks,
the present result carries an important message: it suggests that the presence of a public
rm can reconcile individual incentives to form R&D networks with the objective of
e¢ ciency. In contrast, a conict between stable and e¢ cient networks within a private
market is likely to occur when spillovers are relatively large and there are no subsidies
to R&D. However, when subsidies to R&D are available, such a conict is likely to arise
when spillovers are very small or quite large. The present paper investigates the possibility
of resolving the conict between stable and e¢ cient networks that is likely to arise in a
purely private market, thus highlighting the role of a public rm as a policy instrument in
this setting. Although this result has been derived within a rather limited context, it can
be thought of as a building block that could guide future research aimed at improving our
understanding of the circumstances under which privatisation programs should (not) be
allowed because of the potential adverse consequences they might have on the formation
of R&D networks that are of optimal size from an e¢ ciency point of view.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
4 Discussion and extensions
Our model is rather stylised so it is natural to check the robustness of our results. In what
follows, we extend our analysis in two main directions: R&D subsidies and the number
of rms.
R&D SUBSIDIES
The analysis to this point has abstracted from R&D subsidies. However, the role of an
R&D subsidy is to address fundamental market failures that generate suboptimal invest-
ment levels. In this section we assume that after rms have decided their collaboration
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links, at stage two of the game, the regulator provides a subsidy per unit of R&D e¤ort.
The regulator maximises welfare dened as the sum of consumer surplus and producer
prots net of R&D subsidies
W (g) =
Q2(g)
2
+
2X
i=0
i(g)  s[ei(g) + ej(g) + ek(g)]; i 6= j 6= k:
Because as in Goyal and Moraga-González (2001), Deroian and Gannon (2006), Goyal
et al. (2008), Mauleon et al. (2008) there are no costs associated with the formation of
links, the complete network corresponds to the rst best. However, even in the complete
network an R&D subsidy is needed for three main reasons. First, there is underinvestment
due to imperfect competition. Second, a private rm does not take into account consumer
surplus in its objective and thus chooses a lower level of R&D relative the social optimum
so-called undervaluation e¤ect (Ulph 1999). Third, the objective of the public rm, being
consistent with welfare maximisation, takes into account consumer surplus. In doing so,
the public rm introduces another type of market failure ine¢ ciency in production 
which is related to the composition of R&D. A further source of market failure arises due
to the fact that rms do not fully share the outcomes of their research. Therefore, the
role of an R&D subsidy is two-fold in this setting. It remedies the suboptimal level of
R&D investment by encouraging rms to spend more in R&D. In addition to this, the
subsidy has a cost shifting e¤ect that helps improve the distribution of production costs
between the public and the private rms, thereby increasing productive e¢ ciency.
In the working paper version of this article (Zikos 2008), an extensive analysis of the
subsidy case is provided. Thus our discussion here focuses on the most interesting results.
We nd that R&D e¤ort increases when a private rm establishes new links for three
primary reasons. First, a private rm reduces its own costs by forming collaborations.
This direct e¤ect works toward improving a rms competitive position. Second, the
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formation of new collaborations reduces the costs of partner rms and thereby makes
them stronger competitors. As explained above, the loss a rm su¤ers from the increase
in the competitiveness of its partners outweighs the positive e¤ect of lowering own costs.
Therefore, a private rm reduces its R&D e¤ort when it engages in new partnerships
(recall Proposition 1). However, in the presence of R&D subsidies, there is a potential
countervailing e¤ect: an increase in a private rms R&D e¤ort increases the size of the
R&D subsidy it receives. It turns out that the combined inuence of the subsidy and the
reduction in a rms own costs dominate the increase in the competitiveness of partner
rms. Consequently, a private rm exerts a higher R&D e¤ort when it engages in new
research collaborations. In addition to this, it can be shown that a private rm increases
its R&D e¤ort when spillovers become higher in this setting with R&D subsidies.
We also nd that the complete network is the unique pairwise stable and strongly
stable network. More interestingly, the complete network is the unique Pareto e¢ cient
network. Thus, a public rm can reconcile the conict between stability and e¢ ciency
that is likely to arise in a purely private market, which reinforces the result of our basic
model.
FOUR FIRMS
The analysis to this point has considered an industry consisting of three rms. To assess
the e¤ects of the number of rms most simply, consider a setting with three private rms
and one public rm. While acknowledging that the most realistic scenario would involve
asymmetric network structures, following Goyal and Moraga-González (2001) we cast our
analysis in the context of symmetric networks because our primary objective is to further
explore the stability and e¢ ciency properties of the complete network (see Figure 5). A
symmetric network of degree k is denoted by gk, for k 2 f0; 1; 2; 3g. The degree of a
network (or level of collaborative activity) is dened as the number of links of rm i,
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i 2 f0; 1; 2; 3g.
In this environment, the key qualitative predictions of our basic model persist. In
particular, the complete network g3 is the unique stable network when a public rm
competes with three private rms. The complete network is in addition the unique Pareto
e¢ cient network. Thus, as Proposition 4 reports, a public rm can reconcile individual
incentives for collaboration with the objective of e¢ ciency in this setting.
Proposition 4 Within an industry consisting of a public and three private rms, the
complete network is uniquely stable and e¢ cient in the class of symmetric networks.
This result yields interesting insights into the role that a public rm can play in
inuencing the structure of a network and its e¤ect on the relationship between stable
and e¢ cient networks.13 We emphasise that care should be taken when generalising this
result to markets with many rms, both public and private. However, the simple setting
employed here allows us to draw conjectures about the network architectures that one
might expect to emerge in a more general setting. First, the empty network cannot be
stable since any two rms have an incentive to establish a new connecting link. Second, it
might appear that most of the collaborative alliances are formed between the public rm
and private rms. This is because the public rm invests a larger amount in R&D than
a private rm. Therefore, we would expect to observe networks having the public rm as
a central node. Third, recall that the presence of a public rm reduces the asymmetries
between the linked rms and the isolated one in a three-rm oligopoly. In a more general
setting, we would expect to observe that the smaller the number of private rms, the
stronger is the inuence of the public rm in reducing the competitive advantage of rms
with a large number of links relative to the rms with a smaller number of links, thus
making the network structure more symmetric. Put di¤erently, in an industry with a
large number of public rms, we would expect to observe networks that consist of a
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relatively large number of links. These conjectures also present hypotheses that could be
empirically tested.
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
5 Conclusion
A well-known result is that under a wide set of circumstances private rms underinvest
in R&D due to a lack of full appropriability of the returns to their R&D. Previous au-
thors examined the role of a public rm in regulating innovation activity when rms
are independent competitors. Our approach extended these studies by o¤ering a more
comprehensive view of innovation activity as it allowed the strategic e¤ects of R&D to be
mediated through a network of R&D collaboration. The main novelty of our approach is
that rmsstrategic incentives to invest in R&D are shaped within a network of collab-
oration where they are embedded. Our paper also contributes to the literature on R&D
networks, which has studied extensively the incentives of private rms to form collabora-
tive alliances. This literature has recognised that individual incentives for collaboration
need not always be aligned with the corresponding incentives from an e¢ ciency viewpoint.
We have shown that, in the absence of R&D subsidies, the complete network is the
unique stable network. The stability of the complete network is not the outcome of
any enhancing e¤ect of public ownership on the private rmsincentives to collaborate.
Rather, it is due to the fact that the public rm is an aggressive competitor and as such
it leaves a small residual demand to the private rms. Therefore, by forming additional
links, the private rms can at least partially counter the depressing e¤ect on their prots
resulting from the public rms maximising behaviour. Among other networks, we have
demonstrated that the complete network is Pareto e¢ cient. However, when R&D subsi-
dies are available, the complete network is not only stable but also it is the unique Pareto
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e¢ cient network.
What are the policy implications of the analysis? A public rm can be used as a
policy instrument in tackling the conict between stable and e¢ cient networks that is
likely to arise in a private market. However, we believe that the role of a public rm
in restoring the correctincentives for R&D collaboration would be more prominent the
smaller the size and/or competitiveness of the relevant industry. On one argument, the
fact that a public rm encourages collaborations and thereby promotes R&D spending
helps to alleviate the so-called underinvestment problem. But this introduces another
type of market failure that stems from the fact that the distribution of production costs
is not e¢ cient. Thus, a public rm may be a useful policy instrument, although with
certain limitations. A future promising research direction is to empirically investigate the
relationship between network architectures and the presence of public rms.
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Notes
1These denitions have been adapted to allow for a public rm as a member of a network.
2A natural exception to this occurs in the move from the empty to the public partial network. In
this case, a private rm increases its R&D e¤ort when the level of technological spillovers between
collaborating rms is su¢ ciently high.
3Related is the nding that governments should be allowed to subsidise R&D whenever spillovers are
not too small.
4Nett (1994) considers the case of a mixed duopoly with cost reducing innovation, and shows that
the public rm may opt for producing at a higher cost than the private rm. Moreover, under certain
circumstances, welfare can be higher in the private duopoly than in the mixed duopoly.
5Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr (1996) mention that the locus of innovation is not anymore a rm
as a single entity. Rather, it is the network of collaboration where the rm is embedded.
6The optimality of forming or severing links within a network is conceptualised in terms of prots for
the private rms whereas in terms of welfare (consumers surplus plus aggregate prots) for the public
rm.
7The same approach as in Goyal and Moraga-González (2001) is adopted by Song and Vannetelbosch
(2007).
8Establishing common standards requires that rms incur an investment cost, which can be recovered
in the long-run.
9The empirical literature to date is a bit less clear on this issue. For example, existing ndings suggest
that the probability of collaboration between private rms and universities depends negatively on their
physical distance (see eg. Manseld and Lee 1996; Anselin et al. 1997). Cast in this light, knowledge
externalities between private rms and universities are to a large extent geographically clustered (e.g.
Silicon Valley in California or Waterloo region in Ontario).
10Note that the marginal cost of production is given by ci(g) = @Ci@qi = (c   Ei) + 2qi. Therefore, the
impact of e¤ective R&D on the margin is to induce a downward shift in each rms cost curve, without
a¤ecting its slope. This specication, in a simple way, maintains the spirit of earlier contributions (see
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e.g. dAspremont and Jacquemin 1988; Goyal and Moraga-González 2001; Song and Vannetelbosch
2007; Mauleon et al. 2008).
11White (2002) points out that this assumption can be qualied in several ways. For instance, there
is mixed evidence on the relative e¢ ciency of public and private rms, so that assuming that the public
rm is (ex ante) as e¢ cient as the private rms would seem quite reasonable. Furthermore, public rms
that survive for a signicant time period may fall within the same category of being relatively e¢ cient.
12In the absence of R&D subsidies, the public rm can make a loss in equilibrium for specic values
of the spillover parameter. This is consistent with a number of articles that have appeared lately in the
press according to which about 32.4% and 36.2% of the state-owned industrial rms in China and the
U.S. respectively reported losses at the end of 2005 (see e.g. Windle 2006). This also provides a rational
for why public rms are subsidised in the real world. The implication of R&D subsidies for our results
is analysed in section 4.
13Allowing for asymmetric networks, it can be shown that the complete network still emerges as the
unique stable architecture. However, in addition to the complete network, other networks can be Pareto
e¢ cient due to strategic advantages that can arise in this setting. Namely, the network ij, i 6= j,
i; j 2 f1; 2; 3g; is Pareto e¢ cient if  < 0:087; the network g3n0i; i 2 f1; 2; 3g; is Pareto e¢ cient if
 < 0:89; and the network g3nij, i 6= j, i; j 2 f1; 2; 3g; is Pareto e¢ cient for all values of the spillover
parameter.
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Table
No subsidies conict if spillovers su¢ ciently large
R&D subsidies conict if spillovers small or quite large
(R&D subsidies) and state-owned rm no conicta
Table 1: Potential conict between stable and e¢ cient networks (anew result)
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Figure captions
Figure 1: Six possible network architectures
Figure 2: R&D e¤orts of the public (left panel) and private rms (right panel) when
adding own links
Figure 3: Welfare levels
Figure 4: Prots of private rms (left panel); illustration of intersection points for low
spillovers (right panel)
Figure 5: Symmetric networks with four rms
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Appendix 1. Equilibrium outcomes
Networks with three rms
A.1. The complete network
In the complete network, gc, all rms are connected. The marginal cost of rm i is
given by ci(gc) = c   ei   (ej + ek) + 2qi; i 6= j 6= k: Standard calculations reveal the
equilibrium R&D e¤orts, quantities, prots and welfare
Table 1: Complete network
e0(g
c) = (a  c)(83 + 224   102)=A e(gc) = 2(a  c)(3 + )(11  5)=A
q0(g
c) = 2(a  c)(92 + 83   582)=A q(gc) = 39(a  c)(3 + )=A
0(g
c) = 3(a  c)2B=A2 (gc) = 2(a  c)2(1279 + 220   502)=A2
CS = 2(a  c)2(209 + 122   582)2=A2 W (gc) = (a  c)2C=A2
where A = 703+ 220  3222+203, B = 8989+ 7968  212162  113443+44524
and C = 160373 + 164512   737722   626563 + 198844.
A.2. The private-hub star network
In the private-hub star network, gs, a private rm is at the hub and is connected with
the other two rms. Without loss of generality, let rm 1 be the hub. As for the spoke
rms, each has a collaboration link with the hub and there is no direct link among them,
although they are indirectly connected via the hub. The marginal cost structures are
given by
c0(g
s) = c  e0   e1   (=2)e2 + 2q0; c1(gs) = c  e1   (e0 + e2) + 2q1;
c2(g
s) = c  e2   e1   (=2)e0 + 2q2:
Equilibrium outcomes are readily shown to be the following
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Table 2: Private-hub star network
Private hub rm
eh(gs) = 2(a  c)(11  5)(1140 + 716 + 1022   213)=D
qh(gs) = 39(a  c)(1140 + 716 + 1022   213)=D
h(gs) = 2(a  c)2(1279 + 220   502)(1140 + 716 + 1022   213)2=D2
Table 3: Private-hub star network
Public spoke rm
e0(g
s) = 2(a  c)(15770 + 36128 + 74192   28763 + 704)=D
q0(g
s) = (a  c)(69920 + 66338   193362   108293 + 17694)=D
0(g
s) = (a  c)2F=D2
CS(gs) = (a  c)2(158840 + 117116   251862   124283 + 17694)2=2D2
W (gs) = (a  c)2L=2D2
Table 4: Private-hub star network
Private spoke rm
e(gs) = 2(a  c)(22  7)(570 + 293   1262   103)=D
q(gs) = 78(a  c)(570 + 239   1262   103)=D
(gs) = 4(a  c)2(2558 + 308   492)(570 + 293   1262   103)2=D2
whereD = 267140+139916 855042 185953+59874 2805 and F = 3894034800+
4718797440 44601265722 58611833923 2132549684+8039476045+116163296 
367024427+31097618 and L = 46315722400+63774360320+12970327442 227558599203 
22868974924 + 26990744645 + 953290186   1168717087 + 92214838.
A.3. The public-hub star network
In the public-hub star network, the public rm (hub) maintains a direct link with each
private rm (spoke); the private rms, in turn, are directly connected with the public
39
rm and indirectly connected with each other. The relevant cost structures under gs0 are
thus given by
c0(g
s0) = c  e0   (ei + ej) + 2q0;
ci(g
s0) = c  ei   (e0   (1=2)ej) + 2qi, i 6= j, i; j 2 f1; 2g.
The equilibrium outcomes are as follows
Table 5: Public-hub star network
Public hub rm
eh0(g
s0) = (a  c)(83 + 233   122)=
qh0 (g
s0) = 8(a  c)(23(1 + )  152)=
h0(g
s0) = 3(a  c)2(8989 + 9678   208672   128563 + 47524)=2
CS(gs0) = 2(a  c)2(209 + 131   602)2=2
W (gs0) = (a  c)2(160373 + 175582   702512   700723 + 213284)=2
Private spoke rms
e(gs0) = 2(a  c)(3 + )(11  4)=
q(gs0) = 39(a  c)(3 + )=
(gs0) = 2(a  c)2(3 + )2(1279 + 176   322)=2
where  = 703 + 265   3442 + 163.
A.4. The private partial network
In the private partial network, gp, there is a research collaboration between the two
private rms while the public rm remains outside this collaboration. The relevant (mar-
ginal) cost structures are given by
c0(g
p) = c  e0 + 2q0; c1(gp) = c  e1   e2 + 2q1
c2(g
p) = c  e1   e2 + 2q2:
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Equilibrium outcomes are the following
Table 6: Private partial network
Private linked rms
el(gp) = 6(a  c)(11  2)=H
ql(gp) = 117(a  c)=H
l(gp) = 18(a  c)2(1279 + 88   82)=H2
Public isolated rm
e0(g
p) = (a  c)(83  18 + 42)=H
q0(g
p) = 4(a  c)(46  9 + 22)=H
0(g
p) = 3(a  c)2(8989  3420 + 10842   1443 + 164)=H2
CS (gp) = 2(a  c)2(209  18 + 42)2=H2
W (gp) = (a  c)2(160373  22140 + 69562   7203 + 804)=H2
where H = 703  90 + 202.
A.5. The public partial network
In the public partial network, gp0 , the public rm and a private one maintain a single
collaborative agreement while the remaining private rm stays isolated. Suppose that
the collaboration link is among the public rm j = 0 and the private rm i = 1, without
loss of generality. This generates the following (marginal) cost structures
c0(g
p0) = c  e0   e1 + 2q0; c1(gp0) = c  e1   e0 + 2q1
c2(g
p0) = c  e2 + 2q2:
Equilibrium outcomes are as follows
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Table 7: Public partial network
Linked rms
el0(g
p0) = (a  c)(7885 + 11744   5942)=J
el(gp0) = 2(a  c)(3135 + 124   3112 + 123)=J
ql0(g
p0) = (a  c)(17480 + 10147   59682   263 + 124)=J
ql(gp0) = 39(a  c)(285 + 89   42)=J
l0(g
p0) = 81(a  c)2K=J2
l(gp0) = 2(a  c)2(285 + 89   42)2(1279 + 132   182)=J2
CS(gp0) = 2(a  c)2(19855 + 7277   54412 + 1043 + 64)2=J2
W (gp0) = (a  c)2M=J2
Table 8: Public partial network
Private isolated rm
e(gp0) = 22(a  c)(285 + 24   1222 + 63)=J
q(gp0) = 39(a  c)(285 + 24   1222 + 63)=J
(gp0) = 2558(a  c)2(285 + 24   1222 + 63)2=J2
where J = 66785 + 16834   224722 + 7783 + 124; K = 243377175 + 169536240  
2342338272   1080716803 + 351560644 + 5538645   1425566   6247 + 1448 and
M = 1447366325+933679760 7119602032 2665782683+1363286384 52500005 
1599966 + 18727 + 2168.
A.6. The empty network
In the empty network, ge, there are no collaboration ties. Therefore, rms cannot
acquire part of their rivalsknowledge, given the absence of spillovers. The associated
costs structures are given by ci(ge) = c   ei + 2qi; i 2 f0; 1; 2g. Standard calculations
yield the following equilibrium outcomes
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Table 9: Empty network
Public rm
e0(g
e) = 83(a  c)=703 q0(ge) = 184(a  c)=703
0(g
e) = 26967(a  c)2=494209 CS(ge) = 242(a  c)2=1369
W (ge) = 160373(a  c)2=494209
Private rms
e(ge) = 66(a  c)=703 q(ge) = 117(a  c)=703
(ge) = 23022(a  c)2=494209
Symmetric networks with four rms
A.7. The network of degree k = 3
The cost structure under g3 is given by ci(gc) = c  ei  (ej + ek + el) + 2qi; i 6= j 6=
k 6= l; i; j; k; l 2 f0; 1; 2; 3g. Equilibrium outcomes for a private rms prots and social
welfare are as follows
i(g
3) = 14(a  c)2(3 + )2(241 + 52   142)=2, i 6= 0;
W (g3) = (a  c)2(314996 + 356062   1705952   1598723 + 533664)=2;
where  = 941 + 290   5082 + 423.
A.8. The network of degree k = 2
The cost structures under g2 are as follows
43
c0(g
2) = c  e0   (e1 + e3)  (=2)e2 + 2q0;
c1(g
2) = c  e1   (e0 + e2)  (=2)e3 + 2q1;
c2(g
2) = c  e2   (e1 + e3)  (=2)e0 + 2q2;
c3(g
2) = c  e3   (e0 + e2)  (=2)e1 + 2q3:
Equilibrium outcomes for each private rms prots and social welfare are readily shown
to be the following
1(g
2)  3(g2) = 2(a  c)2(1687 + 312   722)(1308 + 868 + 902   333)2=R2;
2(g
2) = 4(a  c)2(3374 + 572   1212)(654 + 427   2772   183)2=R2;
W (g2) = (a  c)2	=R2;
where R = 410276 + 262200   1964882   462573 + 168674   9905 and 	 =
929939739808+51092193480+25677629462 258729671003 32239250194+41593866865+
1718310656   2347757107 + 209291318.
A.9. The network of degree k = 1
The cost structures under g1 are
c0(g
1) = c  e0   e1 + 2q0;
c1(g
1) = c  e1   e0 + 2q1;
c2(g
1) = c  e2   e3 + 2q2;
c3(g
1) = c  e3   e2 + 2q3:
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Equilibrium outcomes for private prots and social welfare are given by
1(g
1) = 2(a  c)2(1687 + 156   182)(327 + 31   182 + 43)2=T 2;
2(g
1)  3(g1) = 2(a  c)2(1687 + 104   82)(327 + 24   1422 + 63)2=T 2;
W (g1) = (a  c)2
=T 2;
where T = 102569 + 7400   379882 + 65663   9564 + 245 and 
 = 3742467476 +
1181227114 26082861832 1525335083+5137086424 1058369685+166145366 
15843847 + 960008.
A.10. The network of degree k = 0
The cost structure under g0 is ci(g0) = c   ei + 2qi; i 2 f0; 1; 2; 3g. Equilibrium
outcomes for private prots and social welfare are readily shown to be
i(g
0) = 30366(a  c)2=885481, i 6= 0;
W (g0) = 314996(a  c)2=885481:
Appendix 2. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2. Since the term a   c has no inuence on the results in all
proofs we normalise it to 1. We rst show that the complete network gc is pairwise stable.
The stability conditions i(b) and ii(b) are trivially satised since no links can be added
to the complete network. There are two cases to be considered. First, we show that the
pair of private rms i and k have no incentive to delete their link (condition i(a)). Note
that if the rms do so, the resulting network of collaboration will be the public-hub star
network, gs0. To prove our claim, we have to establish the relationship (gc) > (gs0).
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Notice that the subscripts are dropped due to symmetry, i.e. i(gc) = k(gc) = (gc).
Condition i(a) is thus satised since
(gc) = 2(1279 + 220   502)=A2 >
(gs0) = 2(3 + )2(1279 + 176   322)=2;
where A and  are dened as in Tables 1 and 5.
We now turn to show that the stability condition ii(a) is satised. This condition
says that the public rm j and a private rm, say k without loss of generality, are better
o¤ by not severing their link. Notice that the resulting network when rms j and k break
their collaboration tie is the private-hub star network, gs, with rm k being a spokein
gs. Then it is easily established that W (gc) > W (gs) and (gc) > (gs) since
W (gc) = C=A2 > W (gs) = L=2D2 and
(gc) = 3B=A2 >
(gs) = 4(2558 + 308   492)(570 + 293   1262   103)2=D2;
where A, B; C, D and L are dened as in Tables 1, 3 and 4. Therefore, we have shown
that the complete network is pairwise stable. This also proves that the star networks
(public-hub star and private-hub star) are not pairwise stable.
We show next that the empty network is not pairwise stable. The stability conditions
i(a) and ii(a) are trivially satised because there are no links to be deleted from the
empty network. However, condition i(b) is not satised for the empty network since the
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private rms have an incentive to form a link. To see this, note that
(ge) = 23022=494209 < l(gp) = 18(1279 + 88   82)=H2;
where H can be found in Table 6. This su¢ ces to establish that the empty network is
not pairwise stable. Alternatively, one can show that condition ii(b) is violated because
the public rm and a private rm have an incentive to form a collaboration tie, i.e.
W (ge) < W (gp0) and (ge) < l(gp0).
The next step is to show that the partial networks are not pairwise stable. Notice that
conditions i(a) and ii(a) are satised because no pair of rms wants to sever their link.
(This follows from the proof above that the empty network is not stable.) Thus it remains
to show that either condition i(b) or ii(b) is not fullled so that the partial networks are
not stable. We begin to show this for the private partial network, gp. The relevant
condition here is ii(b). That is, a private rm, say rm i without loss of generality, and
the public rm j = 0 are better o¤ by forming a collaboration tie, with rm i being a
hubin the resulting private-hub star network, gs (violation of condition ii(b)). Using
the equilibrium outcomes in Tables 2, 3 and 6, we have that
W (gs) = L=2D2 >
W (gp) = (160373  22140 + 69562   7203 + 804)=H2 and
h(gs) = 2(1279 + 220   502)(1140 + 716 + 1022   213)2=D >
l(gp) = 18(1279 + 88   82)=H2:
Thus the private partial network is not pairwise stable.
Finally, we show that the public partial network gp0 is not pairwise stable. The
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relevant conditions here are i(b) and ii(b). Thus it su¢ ces to show that any condition
is violated for the public partial network to be unstable. Considering the incentives of
the non-linked private rm, say k without loss of generality, and the public rm j = 0 to
form a connecting link, then from Tables 7, 8 and 5 we have that
W (gp0) = M=J2 <
W (gs0) = (160373 + 175582   702512   700723 + 213284)=2 and
(gp0) = 2558(a  c)2(285 + 24   1222 + 63)2=J2 <
(gs0) = 2(3 + )2(1279 + 176   322)=2;
with rm k being a spokein the resulting public-hub star network, gs0. This constitutes
a violation of condition ii(b) for stability and, in turn, establishes our claim. One can
show instead that condition i(b) is violated, because h(gs) > l(gp0) and (gs) > (gp0).
The proof is now complete. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. First we show that the public-hub star network gs0 is not
Pareto e¢ cient. All rms are better o¤ under the complete network. That is, W (gc) >
W (gs0) and (gc) > (gs0). The private-hub star network gs is not Pareto dominated by
the complete network if and only if  < 0:82. This follows by noting thatW (gc) > W (gs),
(gc) > h(gs) i¤  > 0:82 and (gc) > (gs), where h refers to the (private) hub rm
in the star network. Next, we have that W (gc) > W (gp) and (gc) < l(gp) i¤  < 0:13;
hence, the private partial network is not Pareto dominated by the complete network
provided that  < 0:13. We proceed to show that the public partial network gp0 is
not Pareto e¢ cient. The comparisons W (gc) > W (gp0), (gc) < l(gp0) i¤  < 0:04
and (gc) > (gp0) imply that the public partial network is not Pareto dominated by
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the complete network whenever  < 0:04; and vice versa. However, the public partial
network gp0 is Pareto dominated by the private-hub star network gs and thus it is not
Pareto e¢ cient. This follows from W (gs) > W (gp0), h(gs) > l(gp0) and (gs) >
(gp0). Further note that the empty network is not Pareto e¢ cient since W (gc) > W (ge)
and (gc) > (ge). The comparisons above also imply that the complete network is
Pareto e¢ cient because it is not Pareto dominated by any other network. Finally, we
turn to compare the private-hub star network gs and the private partial network gp for
 2 [0; 0:13]. We have that W (gs) > W (gp), h(gs) > l(gp) and (gs) < l(gp) i¤
 < 0:92. Hence, neither of the two networks is Pareto dominant whenever  2 [0; 0:13].
Because the private-hub star network gs and the private partial network gp are not Pareto
dominated by the complete network when  2 [0; 0:82] and  2 [0; 0:13], respectively, it
follows that they are Pareto e¢ cient within each respective range of values of the spillover
parameter.
Proof of Proposition 4. First we show that the complete network of degree k =
3, denoted by g3, is always stable. Consider the coalition of all rms S = 0; 1; 2; 3.
Within the context of symmetric networks gk, with k = 0; 1; 2; 3, there are three possible
deviations from g3 by S (see Figure 5): (i) both pairs of the rms f0,2g and f1,3g deleting
their links to form the network g2; (ii) all pairs of the rms f0,2g, f1,3g, f0; 3g, f1; 2g
deleting their links to form the network g1, and (iii) the coalition of all rms deleting
their links to form the empty network g0. It can be readily shown that both of the pairs
f0,2g and f1,3g have an incentive to maintain their links since W (k = 3) > W (k = 2)
and 2(k = 3) > 2(k = 2); 1(k = 3) > 1(k = 2) and 3(k = 3) > 3(k = 2). Next, we
show that the network g1 is not stable. This follows by noting thatW (k = 3) > W (k = 1),
1(k = 3) > 1(k = 1), 2(k = 3) > 2(k = 1) and 3(k = 3) > 3(k = 1). Finally, we
show that g0 is not stable. We that W (k = 3) > W (k = 0), 1(k = 3) > 1(k = 0),
2(k = 3) > 2(k = 0) and 3(k = 3) > 3(k = 0). Therefore, the complete network
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g3 survives all possible deviations by a coalitions of rms within the class of symmetric
networks gk, with k = 0; 1; 2; 3. Consequently, g3 is the unique (strongly) stable network.
This also proves that the complete network g3 is the unique Pareto e¢ cient network since
it Pareto dominates all other networks. Q.E.D.
